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 1  
Introduction 
 
 This research note provides an update to the funders of the Opportunity NYC 
demonstration of preliminary results from the evaluation of the Family Rewards program. Targeted 
toward very low-income families living in six high-poverty New York City communities, Family 
Rewards offers cash rewards tied to efforts and achievements in the areas of children’s education, 
family preventive health care practices, and parents’ employment. The program is a special 
research demonstration project sponsored by the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity 
(CEO), which is a unit within the Office of the Mayor, and it is being carefully evaluated over 
several years using a random assignment research design. The program and the evaluation are 
privately funded and are part of a portfolio of three incentive-based demonstration projects that 
together are known as Opportunity NYC.
1
    
 
Family Rewards was designed in a partnership involving CEO, MDRC (a national 
nonprofit, nonpartisan social policy research organization), and Seedco (a national workforce and 
social services intermediary organization). Seedco is also the main agency responsible for 
operating the program, in cooperation with six community-based organizations, referred to as 
Neighborhood Partner Organizations (NPOs).
2
 MDRC is conducting the evaluation, which will 
include impact, implementation, and benefit-cost assessments of the program over a five-year 
follow-up period.   
 
What follows in this research note is a brief review of the design of the Family Rewards 
program, its first-year rollout, the evaluation framework for measuring its impacts, participants’ 
receipt of rewards, and preliminary estimates of the program’s impacts on selected educational 
outcomes during the first year. In illustrating its approach to the impact analysis, the paper focuses 
on educational results, because school records are the only data available on program outcomes so 
far. Thus, this document is not meant to serve as a basis for assessing the overall effectiveness of 
the Family Rewards program, even at an early stage. Most of the data required for that assessment 
are still being collected and processed, including a full second year of school administrative 
records data. A report that will present a comprehensive analysis of the program’s implementation 
and early impacts — including its effects on additional education outcomes, employment and 
health outcomes, income, poverty, and a variety of quality-of-life outcomes — is in preparation 
and is scheduled for completion by the end of the year.   
 
 
                                                 
 
1
The other two are the Work Rewards program, which offers financial work incentives for adult members of 
households receiving Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, and the Spark program, a school-based educational 
incentives program for fourth- and seventh-graders. Funds for Opportunity NYC are provided by Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Starr Foundation, American International Group (AIG), the Robin 
Hood Foundation, the Open Society Institute, the Broad Foundation, New York Community Trust, the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the Tiger Foundation. 
 
 
2
The six NPOs and the Community Districts (CDs) they serve are the Brownsville Multi-Service Family Health 
Center (Brooklyn CD 16), Catholic Charities Community Services (Manhattan CD 10), Citizens Advice Bureau 
(Bronx CD 5), Groundwork, Inc. (Brooklyn CD 5), Union Settlement Association (Manhattan CD 11), and Urban 
Health Plan (Bronx CD 6).   
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What Is Opportunity NYC – Family Rewards? 
Family Rewards is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program intended to help families 
break the cycle of intergenerational poverty. It is structured in a way that allows families to gain 
extra resources to reduce their immediate financial hardship while also helping them build their 
human capital to reduce their chances of longer-term and second-generation poverty. The program 
offers incentives to families conditional on efforts and accomplishments in three areas: children’s 
education, family preventive health care practices, and parents’ employment. The education-based 
conditions include children’s superior attendance in school, children’s proficient achievement or 
improved performance on standardized tests, and parental engagement with their children’s 
teachers. Health-based conditions include maintaining health insurance coverage for all children 
and adults in the family as well as getting age-appropriate preventive medical and dental check-ups 
for each family member. Rewards in the workforce area are offered to parents who sustain full-
time employment and to those who participate in approved education or job training while working 
either part time or full time. (See Appendix Table 1 for the full list of incentives.)  
 
Families can receive reward payments every two months for meeting the conditions 
specified by the program. Once Seedco verifies families’ compliance with those conditions, the 
money earned is electronically deposited into bank accounts that the families opened and 
registered with the program. Compliance is established in one of two ways. For school-based 
activities and accomplishments, such as attendance and test scores, Seedco obtains and reviews 
administrative records through a data transfer from the New York City Department of Education 
(DOE). Because families do not have to take any further steps to show that they have met the 
required conditions, those incentives are referred to as “automatically verified” rewards. In 
contrast, families have direct responsibility for proving that they have earned other types of 
rewards. For example, they are required to complete and submit to Seedco forms from a specially 
prepared “coupon book,” along with supporting paper documentation, to show that they had 
attended parent-teacher conferences and other activities that cannot be automatically verified (such 
as annual physicals, dental visits, and full-time work).  
 
Education Rewards 
 
The education incentives are listed in the chart below.
3
 Some portion of the rewards for 
high school students, ranging from 50 percent to 100 percent, is paid directly to the student. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
3
An additional reward for parents to discuss interim low-stakes standardized test results with teachers was dropped 
during the second year of the program.  
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Attendance (95% or more 
of scheduled days)  
 
$25 per month for elementary/middle school students 
$50 for high school students 
 
Annual English Language 
Arts (ELA) and math 
standardized tests  
   
 
For scoring at proficiency levels or improving at least 1 level over 
prior year score:  
$300 for each test for elementary students 
$350 for each test for middle school students  
 
Regents exams  
 
$600 for each test passed by high school students, up to 5 tests 
 
PSAT 
 
$50 once for taking the test  
 
Credit accumulation 
 
$600 for accumulating 11 high school credits per year 
 
High school graduation 
 
$400 once 
 
Parent-teacher 
conferences 
 
 
$25 per conference, twice per year (all grades) 
 
Parent meetings with 
teachers to discuss annual 
ELA and math test results  
 
$25 once per year for elementary/middle school students 
 
 
Library card  
 
$50 once during the program (all grades) 
 
Target Group and Random Assignment 
 
 Family Rewards was targeted to families living in one of six high-poverty community 
districts in New York City
4
 — two in upper Manhattan, two in the Bronx, and two in Brooklyn — 
and whose family income was at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty line. In addition, 
eligible families had to have at least one child set to enter one of three “target” grades — fourth, 
seventh, or ninth grade — in September 2007. These grades were chosen because they represent 
the start of critical transition periods in education and also ensure a wide distribution of grade 
levels for the full sample. Once a family was enrolled, all of the children in the family became 
eligible for the incentives. 
 
Eligible families were identified from DOE records. DOE sent MDRC a file of all children 
living in the selected community districts who were set to enter either the fourth, seventh, or ninth 
grade for the 2007-08 school year and who, in the prior year, were either enrolled in the federal 
free school lunch program (which is available for families with incomes at or below 130 percent of 
the poverty line) or attended a universal feeding school (where most of the children are from low-
                                                 
 
4
These community districts encompass a variety of neighborhoods, including the following: Central and East 
Harlem in Manhattan; Brownsville and East New York in Brooklyn; and Morris Heights/Mount Hope and East 
Tremont/Belmont in the Bronx.  
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income families). Contact information from these centralized school records, supplemented by 
other information, was then used for recruiting families.  
 
A total of 4,778 families (with 11,500 children less than a year old through age 18, and 
9,212 school-age children) eventually enrolled in the study (the goal had been 5,100 families). Half 
of all enrollees were assigned randomly to Family Rewards and half were assigned to the control 
group. With random assignment beginning in July 2007, and program operations starting just a few 
months later, in September 2007, the program staff faced an extraordinarily tight timetable for 
enrolling the sample.  
 
Recruitment turned out to be very challenging, particularly because of outdated contact 
information on the DOE records. Many families were no longer living at the addresses recorded on 
the central DOE database. As a result, intake took longer than had been hoped, with some families 
enrolling late in the first semester of the new school year. The chart below shows, by month of 
random assignment, the build-up of the sample of children used in the impact analysis reported on 
in this paper. As can be seen, 70 percent of the children had enrolled by the end of September 
2007, but the remaining 30 percent came in after that.  
 
 Most of the school outcomes analyzed for this paper cover the entire 2007-08 school year, 
but the annual standardized ELA and math tests were administered in January and March 2008, 
respectively. This schedule left only a few months (and much less than that in some cases) between 
the time that families enrolled in the study and the time that elementary and middle school students 
had to take the ELA and math tests.  
 
Enrollment month Count Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
 
July 2007 1,688 18.32 
 
18.32 
Aug 2007 2,986 32.40 50.72 
Sept 2007 1,798 19.51 70.23 
Oct 2007 1,486 16.12 86.35 
Nov 2007 684 7.42 93.77 
Dec 2007 521 5.65 99.42 
Jan 2008 51 0.55 99.98 
Mar 2008 2 0.02 100.00 
 
Research Samples   
 
 The children included in the analysis are spread throughout the grade distribution, from 
kindergarten through grade 12, but, as intended, are represented most heavily in the target grades 
(fourth, seventh, and ninth grades). 
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Grade Count Percentage 
K 270 2.9 
1 364 4.0 
2 446 4.8 
3 427 4.6 
4 1,726 18.7 
5 459 5.0 
Total elementary 
school 3,692 40.0 
6 474 5.1 
7 1,672 18.2 
8 442 4.8 
Total middle 
school 2,588 28.1 
9 1,956 21.2 
10 482 5.2 
11 277 3.0 
12 217 2.4 
Total high school 2,932 31.8 
Total (all grades) 9,212 100.0 
For the analysis, the children have been grouped into elementary (K-5), middle school (6-
8), and high school (9-12) grade levels. These three groups are different developmentally and also 
faced a different incentive structure (especially high school students versus students in lower 
grades). Effects will also be presented for each of the target grades, particularly in future reports as 
students are followed through key school transition stages. 
  
Receipt of Reward Payments  
 
 This section presents summary data on family members’ receipt of rewards during the first 
program year. Table 1 shows that almost all families (99 percent) earned rewards, both in the 
education domain (95 percent) and in the health domain (94 percent). Fewer (41 percent) earned 
workforce rewards. The average family was substantially engaged in the program, earning 25 
rewards across the three domains over the year and earning a total of $2,974.
5
 About 43 percent of 
families earned $3,000 or more. In addition, while nearly all families (97 percent) earned 
automatically verified rewards (which, from the families’ standpoint, is a passive process), most 
(83 percent) also earned coupon-book rewards, which required active engagement with the 
program in order to claim a payment. (A more detailed analysis of the patterns of reward receipt, 
including receipt of the health care and employment rewards, will be presented in the full 
evaluation report due later this year).   
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About 6.5 percent of families who had earned rewards during Year 1 did not receive any payments because they 
did not have bank accounts, had problems with or changes in their bank accounts, or faced other administrative 
problems that were not resolved within the period for which data are available for this paper. The average amount paid 
to families is thus somewhat lower ($2,841) than the average amount earned ($2,974), meaning that payments were 
about 96 percent of earnings.   
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 Table 2 presents findings on the receipt of education rewards by school level. Most 
students earned rewards (84 percent to 93 percent). High school students were not more likely to 
earn rewards than younger students, but they earned higher average cash amounts ($1,320 versus 
$818 and $684). This difference reflects the fact that, by design, more rewards were offered for 
high school students, and for larger amount of money.  
 
 Overall, the most common reward earned for education was for high attendance, with 72 
percent and 74 percent of elementary and middle school students (respectively) and 58 percent of 
high school students earning at least one reward of this type. Rewards for parents attending parent-
teacher conferences and for students obtaining library cards were also common, although reward 
rates for these activities were higher among elementary and middle school students than among 
high school students.    
 
Data and Methods for the Impact Analysis  
 
 The impact estimates reported in this paper are based on data obtained from New York City 
DOE administrative records for the following measures:
6
  
 
 Attendance for each month of the 2007-08 school year, 
 Test scores for the annual ELA exam, taken in January 2008, 
 Test scores for the annual math exam, taken in March 2008, 
 Credits attempted and earned (2007-08 school year), and 
 Regents exams taken and passed (2007-08 school year). 
To obtain school outcomes data from DOE for each child in the study, one would ideally 
use the child’s school ID, which is unique to each student in the system. Because children in the 
target grades were identified using DOE records at the time of recruitment, school IDs were 
obtained for most of these students. The more difficult case was for nontarget children (siblings of 
the target children), for whom there was no prior DOE data. Parents were not required to provide 
student IDs for their children when they enrolled in the study, as few were likely to have known 
them. Therefore, for nontarget children, and a few target children, MDRC matched to DOE records 
using student name, date of birth, and other information. Match rates were very high for all grades: 
above 95 percent for students in the target grades and above 90 percent for students in all other 
grades. 
Estimating Impacts  
 
Impacts were estimated using a random assignment research design in which average 
outcomes for the program group were compared with average outcomes for the control group. To 
improve the precision of the impact estimates, the analysis used a regression model in which the 
outcome of interest is regressed on a variable indicating the random assignment treatment status 
(that is, in the Family Rewards program versus in the control group), plus the following variables: 
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Data are also being collected on discharges (September 2007 through December 2008), promotions (September 
2007 through December 2008), special education status (2007-08 school year), and suspensions (2007-08 school year), 
and impacts on these outcomes will be reported in the comprehensive evaluation report schedule to be completed by 
the end of the year. 
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student’s grade level, prior year test scores (math and ELA), community district, gender, race, 
special education status, English language learner, number of children in the household, two-parent 
family, mother’s education level, and mother’s work status. The current models also include one 
“school environment” measure, average class size, obtained from the DOE school report card data. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the family level.
7
 
 
Subgroup Analysis 
 
For the first comprehensive impact report due later this year, effects will be estimated for 
selected subgroups of the full sample. All subgroups are pre-specified, meaning that they are 
selected based on theoretical and prior empirical grounds, before any subgroup impact findings 
from the current study are calculated. In what are called “confirmatory” analyses, program effects 
will be examined across two or three subgroups. As the name suggests, confirmatory subgroup 
analyses are designed to test well-defined theories about how the effects of Family Rewards might 
vary across particular subgroup categories. If no theory predicting a clear direction of effects 
exists, confirmatory analyses will test whether subgroup differences found in other studies are also 
observed for Family Rewards. These analyses are considered core elements of the study, and the 
results will be subject to fairly rigorous statistical testing.  
 
Effects will also be examined across a range of other subgroups, in what are called 
“exploratory” analyses. For these subgroups, there is often no strong theory about why the effects 
might vary across subgroup categories or no compelling evidence of subgroup differences from 
earlier studies. The results of exploratory analyses are not considered as robust or certain, but may 
point to areas of interest for further research and possible confirmation.  
 
The need to treat subgroup analysis so carefully arises from the statistical reality that the 
more subgroups that are analyzed, the more likely it is that some effects will be found to be 
statistically significant simply by chance. As a result, the evaluation plans to follow existing 
standards and limit the number of confirmatory subgroups that are analyzed to two or three and 
place caution around the interpretation of the exploratory subgroup analyses. 
 
 For the education outcomes, confirmatory analysis will be conducted for subgroups defined 
by the following factors: 
 
1. Prior year’s performance on annual standardized tests (ELA and math). There is 
reason to expect varying effects by prior-year performance, although many studies do not 
find significant differences. In the case of incentives, some experts have raised the 
possibility that lower-performing students will suffer reduced intrinsic motivation and 
greater discouragement because they do not earn the payments, thus harming their 
performance even more (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 2001). It may also be that even if 
lower-performing students do no worse when offered incentives, they may simply not 
benefit from incentives because they face educational impediments that incentives alone 
                                                 
 
7
Although students were assigned to the program randomly, it is possible that the two research groups are 
distributed differently across schools. To account for this possibility, impacts were also estimated using models that 
include school “fixed effects,” comparing outcomes for program and control groups within each school. The results 
were very similar to those presented here.  
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cannot address. Consequently, another concern is that the rewards, particularly those for 
high test scores, will go largely to more advantaged and capable students, perhaps 
increasing their performance but not helping to reduce the educational achievement gap 
between more advantaged and less advantaged students. Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 
(2008) examined this issue for an incentives program in Kenya and found that awards for 
high test scores increased performance throughout the test score distribution, or even 
among students who had little chance of receiving the award.
8
 Effects by prior performance 
have been examined in MDRC studies of educational interventions that do not involve the 
use of financial incentives, but differences have typically not been found (Rebeck-Black et 
al., 2008). Nonetheless, the strong theoretical basis for expecting that lower-performing and 
higher-performing students may respond differently to financial incentives makes this type 
of subgroup analysis an important one for the Family Rewards evaluation.   
 
2. School environment, likely to be measured by test scores of earlier cohorts. Although 
various measures of school quality have not always been found to affect student 
achievement, it seems reasonable to expect that a student’s (or parent’s) ability to respond 
to the educational incentives offered by Family Rewards will depend on their school 
environment. Large class sizes and disruptive or low-performing peers, for example, may 
inhibit a student’s ability to learn more and perform better. Alternatively, students in such 
schools who are offered incentives may make more effort to take advantage of whatever 
opportunities exist, and thus perform better than they would without the incentives. In 
better schools, students may have more opportunity to learn, and the incentives may induce 
them to take fuller advantage of those opportunities; or, the incentives may have a more 
marginal influence on their efforts and achievement levels relative to the influence of the 
school environment itself. Krueger and Whitmore (2002) provide evidence that other types 
of educational interventions have been more effective in certain types of school 
environments. In particular, they find evidence that the effects of class size reductions vary 
according to school quality (this also seems to explain the differences in effects by race). 
Students attending lower-performing schools benefited more from class size reductions 
than those in higher-performing schools. The authors argued that teachers have an easier 
time teaching in large classes with higher-performing students, so that the added benefit 
from reducing class size in these schools was not large. 
 
3. Parent’s education level. Parent’s education level has a strong effect on children’s school 
performance, but may also affect a parent’s ability to respond to the incentives. For 
example, more-educated parents may understand the rewards better and be more capable of 
helping their children improve their school performance in response to the incentives. 
Alternatively, they may already be more highly engaged with their children’s education, 
and perhaps the program will make more of a difference for the children of less-educated 
parents.  
 
 Exploratory subgroup analyses will likely be conducted for groups defined by the 
following baseline characteristics:  
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Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2003) find some evidence of discouragement effects for lower-
performing students in an incentive program for college freshman, but they have very small sample sizes. 
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 Race/ethnicity (black versus Hispanic versus white),  
 Gender (girls versus boys), 
 Subsidized housing status (Section 8 voucher, public housing, private housing), 
 Area (across six community districts or three boroughs), 
 TANF versus non-TANF recipients, 
 Family income (very low income versus other). 
 
 To date, effects have been able to be estimated for subgroups defined by prior academic 
performance. In this case, students are grouped according to whether they scored at the proficient 
level or higher (i.e., at least a level 3 on a 4-level scale) on the math test in the year prior to 
entering the study.  
 
Why the Preliminary Impact Findings Should Be Viewed Cautiously 
 The impact findings available at this time are based on data from the New York City DOE. 
They offer only a very preliminary assessment of Family Rewards for several reasons. First, the 
program was designed and put into operation quickly — within about nine months. Thus, the first 
year was very much a “start-up” year, and the organizations administering the program 
experienced a steep learning curve with respect to how best to educate families about the 
incentives and how to engage them in the program. There were also delays in providing families 
with materials that explained the program and with the forms they would need in order to claim 
certain rewards. Second, some school outcomes were measured quite soon after the launch of the 
program in September 2007. In particular, the first ELA exam was administered in January 2008 
(only about four months later), and the math exam was given in March 2008. One would not 
expect effects on these outcomes after such a short period of enrollment, especially since nearly 30 
percent of participating families enrolled in the study after October 1, 2007. Third, given the 
comprehensiveness and complexity of the set of incentives offered by Family Rewards, it is 
reasonable to expect that many families would require more time to understand the incentives and 
how to respond to them. For example, in the education domain, it might take parents a fair amount 
of time to become engaged in their children’s education in new ways, for children to modify their 
study habits, and/or for families to identify and obtain additional assistance (for example, after-
school programs, tutoring, homework help) that might improve their children’s school 
performance. In fact, the program’s designers expected that some families would not begin to 
respond appreciably to the incentives offer until well past the first year, and this was an important 
consideration in proposing a three-year incentives program in the original design of the Family 
Rewards model. Finally, school administrative records capture only a small set of the outcome 
measures that will be examined as part of the overall impact evaluation. Data from a one-year 
follow-up survey, which, at the time of this writing, is still being administered to families, will 
provide a fuller picture of how families responded to the educational incentives by measuring such 
outcomes as parents’ involvement with their children’s schooling and children’s use of tutoring 
help and participation in other school activities. In addition, that survey, along with extensive 
administrative records data from a variety of sources, will be used to assess the program’s early 
effects on outcomes in all three program areas — education, health care, and parents’ employment. 
These results will be included in the evaluation’s first comprehensive report on Family Rewards, 
which is scheduled for completion by the end of 2009.     
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Summary of Preliminary Impact Findings 
  The preliminary impact findings available at this time, which are described more fully 
in the sections that follow, show positive first-year effects on a number of educational outcome 
measures for high school students, but not among elementary or middle school students. High 
school students in the Family Rewards program were somewhat more likely than their control 
group counterparts to meet a very high attendance standard, to attempt the annual minimum 
number of credits required for staying on track for an on-time graduation, and to attempt and pass 
at least one Regents exam during the year. The impacts were substantially larger for ninth-graders 
who, prior to entering the study, had performed at a level deemed “proficient” on the annual 
standardized math exam in eighth grade, which is one measure of academic achievement and 
preparation for high school, compared with the impacts among students who scored at lower levels 
on that test.     
Results for Elementary and Middle School Students 
 
Attendance 
 
Table 3 presents impacts of Family Rewards on attendance rates for elementary and middle 
school students. It should be noted that average attendance rates among students in the control 
group exceeded 90 percent during the first year of the program, which is considerably higher than 
the rate observed for high school students. Although only 41 percent and 40 percent of the 
elementary and middle school controls (respectively) met the 95 percent attendance standard, those 
who fell short nonetheless had quite high average attendance (given the overall average). Family 
Rewards produced no changes on these measures of attendance.  
 
ELA and Math Test Scores 
 
Table 4 presents the first-year findings on annual ELA and math test scores for elementary 
and middle school students. (As noted above, these tests were administered very soon after sample 
members began the first school year covered by the Family Rewards program.) The left columns 
show the scale scores and the right columns show the fraction of students scoring at a proficient 
level. The data show the familiar pattern of disadvantaged students falling further behind as they 
age. Proficiency rates in math, in particular, fall significantly from the early to the later grades. The 
program had no effect on average test scores or proficiency levels. (Less than 5 percent of students 
were missing data or did not take the exams, and this fraction did not differ between the research 
groups). 
Subgroup Results 
 
 Table 5 presents subgroup findings, comparing the program’s effects on students who 
differed in terms of their scores on the annual standardized math and ELA exams in the year prior 
to entering the study. As was the case with the full sample, Family Rewards produced no impacts 
for either subgroup on the available educational outcome measures. 
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Results for High School Students 
Attendance 
 
Table 6 presents impacts on attendance among high school students. The top panel presents 
results for all students in grades 9 through 12, while the bottom panel focuses only on the ninth-
grade target group. The table shows that the program had no effects on average attendance rates, 
but it did increase the fraction of high school students with an attendance rate of 95 percent or 
higher. As shown in the top panel, only 28.0 percent of high school students in the control group 
met this benchmark, compared with 31.4 percent of those in the Family Rewards group, for a 
statistically significant impact of 3.4 percentage points. This represents an increase of 12 percent 
over the control group rate.  
 
Credits  
 
Table 7 presents estimates of impacts on credits attempted and earned, for high school 
students. “Credits attempted” refers to the number of credits students hope to earn through the 
courses they formally enrolled in, while “credits earned” are based on passing the course. Thus, 
credits attempted may signify a form of effort, while credits earned signifies a form of 
achievement.  
 
Family Rewards increased the percentage of students attempting at least 11 credits (the 
minimum number necessary for staying on track for an on-time graduation). For example, among 
the ninth- to twelfth-grade sample (top panel of Table 7), 84.3 percent of the Family Rewards 
group attempted 11 credits, compared with 81.8 percent of the control group, for a statistically 
significant increase of 2.5 percentage points (or a 3 percent gain over the control group). The 
program had no effect on the percentage of students earning 11 credits.  
 
Regents Exams 
 
 Table 8 presents estimates of the program’s impacts on high school students’ Regents exam 
results. It shows that the program increased the percentage of students taking at least one Regents 
exam and also increased the percentage that had passed at least one exam during the 2007-08 
school year. For example, 42 percent of high school students in the Family Rewards group passed 
a Regents exam, compared with 38.5 percent rate of those in the control group, yielding a 
statistically significant difference of 3.5 percentage points. This impact represents a gain of 9.1 
percent over the control group rate.  
 
Effects for Subgroups 
 Table 9 presents findings from one of the planned subgroup analyses. It shows the 
program’s impacts separately for ninth-grade students who were more academically prepared for 
high school when they entered the study versus those who were less academically prepared, at 
least as measured by their performance on the eighth-grade annual standardized math test. (Those 
who scored at proficiency levels on that exam, i.e., at level 3 or higher, are considered to be more 
academically prepared.) As Table 9 shows, Family Rewards had larger positive effects on students 
in that subgroup (who make up 34 percent of the overall sample of ninth-graders) relative to 
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students who entered the study less academically prepared for high school (who make up 66 
percent of the ninth-grade sample). For example, for the better-prepared subgroup, the program 
increased the likelihood of attending school at least 95 percent of scheduled days by 8 percentage 
points (a 17 percent gain over the control group mean for that subgroup), but it had no statistically 
significant impact on this measure for the less-prepared subgroup. It also increased credits earned 
by 8.6 percentage points (a 12.5 percent gain over the control group rate) and the likelihood of 
passing a Regents exam by 7.1 percentage points (a gain of 10.5 percent over the control group 
rate). In contrast, the program produced no statistically significant impacts on these measures for 
those who had not scored at a proficiency level on their eighth-grade annual math exam. 
(However, there was a positive impact for that latter group on attempting 11 credits.) Although the 
only differences in impacts that were statistically significant across the two subgroups were the 
impacts on the measures of credits earned (as indicated by the daggers to the right of the impact 
estimates), the pattern of results across all measures suggests that the impacts of Family Rewards 
were generally larger overall for the ninth-graders who were more academically prepared for high 
school when they entered the study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The first year of Family Rewards, which was very much a “start-up” period of program 
operations, saw a number of important accomplishments as critical program elements were 
implemented successfully. These elements included systems for claims processing and 
verification, systems for making electronic payments into participant bank accounts, and strategies 
for marketing the program to families and educating them on the incentives offer. Nearly all 
families earned and were paid at least some rewards, receiving nearly $3,000, on average. During 
the second year, which is still under way, attention has focused on improving the functioning of 
these systems, and, in particular, refining and strengthening the strategies for helping families 
understand the rewards and how they can improve their opportunities to earn more of them. 
Further operational improvements are planned for the third year, which will offer a somewhat 
streamlined schedule of incentives. This modified set of incentives is intended to make it easier to 
market the program to participants, simplify the procedures for processing and verifying claims, 
and reduce the cost of the program.   
 
 The preliminary impact results presented in this paper reflect an early and very partial look 
at the effects of Family Rewards on selected educational outcomes. The findings show that the 
program has produced some encouraging first-year impacts on important educational outcome 
measures among high school students, particularly among ninth-graders who had entered the 
program having demonstrated proficiency on their prior-year annual standardized math test. The 
analysis so far does not show first-year impacts on school performance for younger students. It is 
important to recognize, however, that, by themselves, the impact findings available for this 
preliminary analysis are not a basis for assessing the program’s overall effectiveness. MDRC is 
continuing to collect and analyze data (from administrative records and a detailed survey of 
program and control group members) on these and other aspects of children’s school performance, 
as well as on health outcomes, income, poverty, work, quality of life, and a variety of other 
measures that together will provide a basis for a fuller assessment of the early effects of Family 
Rewards. The first comprehensive evaluation report, which will include an analysis of program 
implementation experiences as well as program impacts, is scheduled to be completed by the end 
of the year.  
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Tables 
Outcome
Family earned at least one reward (%) 98.8
Family earned at least one: (%)
Education reward 94.6
Health care reward 93.9
Workforce reward 41.4
Family earned at least one: (%)
Automatically verified reward 97.4
Coupon book reward 83.0
Average reward amount earned
a
 ($) 2,974
Distribution of average reward amount earned:
a
 (%)
Less than $1,000 16.4
$1,000-$2,999 40.6
$3,000-$4,999 28.0
$5,000 or more 15.1
Sample size 2,377
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 1
Summary of Rewards Earned by Families in the First Program Year
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Seedco's MIS and payment data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008. Payment data updated 
through December 22, 2008, are included in these tables. Sample size refers to the number of families.
aReward amounts are calculated only for families who earned any rewards.
Outcome
Elementary 
School
Middle 
School
High 
School
Student earned at least one education reward (%) 88.0 93.3 83.6
Average reward amount earned
a
 ($) 684 818 1,320
Student earned at least one education reward for: (%)
Attendance 71.7 74.3 58.1
Regent Exam - Math A  NA NA 21.9
Regent Exam - Global History and Geography NA NA 7.2
Regent Exam - US History and Government  NA NA 9.4
Regent Exam - Comprehensive English  NA NA 8.0
Regent Exam - Science  NA NA 23.5
Credit accumulation NA NA 44.2
Graduation NA NA 7.0
Test scores - ELA 30.0 39.9 NA
Test scores - Math 40.5 52.6 NA
Library card 60.4 62.3 55.8
PSAT NA NA 5.1
62.5 59.1 46.3
Sample size 2,141 1,321 1,653
Table 2
Education Rewards Earned in First Program Year, by School Level
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Percentage of students whose parents earned 
a parent-teacher conference reward
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Seedco's MIS and payment data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008. Payment data  updated through 
December 22, 2008, are included in these tables. Sample size refers to the number of students. 
NA = not applicable.
aReward amounts are calculated only for families who earned any rewards.
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Kindergarten to 5th-grade students
Average attendance rate 91.6 91.0 0.5 0.154 0.051
Attendance rate is 95% or higher (%) 43.8 41.0 2.8 0.120 0.056
Sample size 1,889 1,803
6th- to 8th-grade students
Average attendance rate 90.5 89.9 0.6 0.194 0.051
Attendance rate is 95% or higher (%) 41.9 39.7 2.2 0.252 0.045
Sample size 1,268 1,320
Target grades only
4th-grade students
Average attendance rate 91.5 90.9 0.5 0.379 0.043
Attendance rate is 95% or higher (%) 43.3 43.2 0.1 0.951 0.003
Sample size 862 864
7th-grade students
Average attendance rate 91.1 90.7 0.4 0.442 0.036
Attendance rate is 95% or higher (%) 43.5 43.0 0.5 0.823 0.011
Sample size 823 849
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Table 3
First-Year Impacts on Attendance:
Elementary and Middle School Students
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from NYC Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
First-year education results cover the 2007-08 school year.
Program Control Difference Effect Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
3rd- to 5th-grade students
Math test 668.5 667.5 1.0 0.361 0.027 73.0 71.2 1.8 0.246 0.039
ELA test 647.6 646.6 0.9 0.363 0.028 49.5 49.9 -0.4 0.821 -0.008
Sample size 1,338 1,274 1,338 1,274
6th- to 8th-grade students
Math test 653.1 653.2 -0.1 0.873 -0.004 58.8 56.8 2.0 0.206 0.041
ELA test 644.9 646.0 -1.1 0.176 -0.038 44.7 43.9 0.8 0.617 0.016
Sample size 1,268 1,320 1,268 1,320
Target grades only
4th-grade students
Math test 669.4 668.8 0.5 0.641 0.015 73.4 71.2 2.1 0.238 0.048
ELA test 646.9 647.0 -0.2 0.891 -0.005 50.7 51.0 -0.3 0.883 -0.006
Sample size 862 864 862 864
7th-grade students
Math test 653.7 654.4 -0.7 0.517 -0.020 60.4 59.6 0.8 0.669 0.017
ELA test 648.7 649.2 -0.5 0.591 -0.018 50.6 50.7 -0.1 0.973 -0.001
Sample size 823 849 823 849
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Scaled Score of Test Percentage of Students who Scored at Proficiency Levels
a
Table 4
First-Year Impacts on ELA and Math Standardized Tests:
Elementary and Middle School Students
(continued)
Table 4 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from NYC Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
First-year education results cover the 2007-08 school year.
aIn New York State, a test score that is at level 3 or above on a 4-level scale is deemed to be a "proficient" level of achievement.
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Scored at or above proficiency level 
on annual standardized test
a
 in prior school year
b
4th- to 5th-grade students
Average attendance rate 92.6 91.7 0.9 0.106 0.083
Students with more than 95% attendance (%) 49.3 47.0 2.3 0.367 0.045
Math Scaled Score 679.7 679.1 0.6 0.664 0.020
Students meeting proficiency standard on math test (%) 86.9 86.1 0.8 0.648 0.023
ELA Scaled Score school year 667.9 667.5 0.5 0.768 0.017
Students meeting proficiency standard on ELA (%) 78.0 79.6 -1.6 0.539 -0.038
Sample size 803 749
6th- to 8th-grade students
Average attendance rate 92.3 92.3 0.0 0.990 -0.001
Students with more than 95% attendance (%) 51.7 49.9 1.9 0.503 0.037
Math Scaled Score 672.7 673.1 -0.4 0.765 -0.015
Students meeting proficiency standard on math test (%) 84.6 84.6 0.0 0.994 0.000
ELA Scaled Score school year 665.7 665.3 0.5 0.694 0.023
Students meeting proficiency standard on ELA (%) 79.8 78.4 1.4 0.575 0.035
Sample size 663 636
Scored at or above proficiency level 
on annual standardized test
a
 in prior school year
b
4th- to 5th-grade students
Average attendance rate 89.5 90.2 -0.7 0.466 -0.061
Students with more than 95% attendance (%) 33.2 33.9 -0.7 0.860 -0.015
Math Scaled Score 633.0 633.9 -1.0 0.671 -0.034
Students meeting proficiency standard on math test (%) 29.1 26.1 3.0 0.450 0.066
ELA Scaled Score school year 632.0 632.5 -0.5 0.721 -0.018
Students meeting proficiency standard on ELA (%) 29.8 29.5 0.3 0.907 0.007
Sample size 264 293
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Table 5
(continued)
First-Year Impacts on Attendance and Annual Test Scores, 
Elementary and Middle School Students
by Prior-Year Standardized Test Scores:
Program Control Difference Effect
Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
6th- to 8th-grade students
Average attendance rate 88.9 88.0 0.9 0.229 0.070
Students with more than 95% attendance (%) 31.8 29.1 2.7 0.331 0.059
Math Scaled Score 631.5 632.1 -0.6 0.715 -0.018
Students meeting proficiency standard on math test (%) 29.7 27.5 2.3 0.383 0.050
ELA Scaled Score school year 634.1 635.5 -1.4 0.213 -0.055
Students meeting proficiency standard on ELA (%) 25.1 25.1 0.0 1.000 0.000
Sample size 565 629
Table 5 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from NYC Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Tests for statistical significance on impacts across subgroups will be calculated in the future. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
First-year education results cover the 2007-08 school year.
aFor subgroup results pertaining to impacts on attendance and the annual math test, sample members were 
categorized according to their prior-year math test scores. For the subgroup results pertaining to impacts on the 
ELA test, sample members were categorized according to their prior-year ELA test scores.
bIn New York State, a test score that is at level 3 or above on a 4-level scale is deemed to be a "proficient" 
level of achievement.
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
9th- to 12th-grade students
Average attendance rate 81.3 80.9 0.4 0.630 0.018
Attendance rate is 95% or higher (%) 31.4 28.0 3.4 ** 0.043 0.073
Sample size 1,538 1,539
Target grades only
9th-grade students
Average attendance rate 81.8 81.5 0.3 0.764 0.013
Attendance rate is 95% or higher (%) 34.0 31.6 2.4 0.228 0.052
Sample size 988 991
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Table 6
First-Year Impacts on Attendance:
High School Students
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from NYC Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
First-year education results cover the 2007-08 school year.
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
9th- to 12th-grade students
Attempted at least 11 credits 84.3 81.8 2.5 ** 0.046 0.066
Earned at least 11 credits 49.8 49.5 0.3 0.875 0.006
Sample size 1,538 1,539
Target grades only
9th-grade students
Attempted at least 11 credits 87.5 84.2 3.4 ** 0.018 0.097
Earned at least 11 credits 49.6 50.1 -0.5 0.815 -0.010
Sample size 988 991
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Table 7
First-Year Impacts on Credits Earned:
High School Students
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from NYC Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
First-year education results cover the 2007-08 school year.
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
9th- to 12th-grade students
Took at least 1 Regents Exam 70.0 65.0 5.0 *** 0.002 0.107
Took 1 Regents Exam 23.5 22.1 1.4 0.338 0.034
Took 2 Regents Exams 27.2 24.2 3.1 ** 0.050 0.070
Took 3+ Regents Exams 19.3 18.8 0.5 0.695 0.013
Took English Regents Exam 16.0 13.0 3.0 *** 0.006 0.086
Passed English Regents Exam 9.0 7.7 1.3 0.144 0.047
Took Math A Regents Exam 18.3 16.0 2.2 * 0.068 0.059
Passed Math A Regents Exam 9.1 8.6 0.4 0.658 0.016
Took US History Regents Exam 18.4 15.7 2.7 ** 0.041 0.071
Passed US History Regents Exam 9.7 8.3 1.4 0.153 0.050
Took Global History Regents Exam 18.9 16.9 2.0 * 0.093 0.053
Passed Global History Regents Exam 7.1 7.0 0.2 0.870 0.006
Average number of Regents Exams passed 71.1 66.8 4.3 0.182 0.044
Passed at least 1 Regents Exam 42.0 38.5 3.5 ** 0.026 0.072
Sample size 1,538 1,539
Target grade only
9th-grade students
Took at least 1 Regents Exam 66.3 62.3 4.1 ** 0.045 0.085
Took 1 Regents Exam 27.7 25.7 2.0 0.318 0.045
Took 2 Regents Exams 28.9 26.6 2.3 0.242 0.052
Took 3+ Regents Exams 9.7 9.9 -0.3 0.852 -0.008
Took English Regents Exam 5.1 3.3 1.8 ** 0.050 0.088
Passed English Regents Exam 2.3 1.3 1.0 * 0.096 0.077
Took Math A Regents Exam 8.5 7.2 1.3 0.292 0.047
Passed Math A Regents Exam 4.3 4.3 0.1 0.932 0.004
Took US History Regents Exam 11.2 10.9 0.3 0.850 0.009
Passed US History Regents Exam 4.7 4.8 -0.1 0.951 -0.003
Took Global History Regents Exam 6.6 4.4 2.2 ** 0.033 0.095
Passed Global History Regents Exam 2.7 2.5 0.2 0.803 0.011
(continued)
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Table 8
First-Year Impacts on Regents Tests:
High School Students
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Passed at least 1 Regents Exam 36.8 34.7 2.1 0.246 0.044
Sample size 988 991
Table 8 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from NYC Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: The overall outcome measures in this table include the following Regents Exams: English, Math A, 
Math B, Integrated Algebra, US History, Global History, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, and Earth Science.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
First-year education results cover the 2007-08 school year.
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Scored at or above proficiency level 
on annual math test in prior school year
a
Average attendance rate 91.6 88.0 3.6 *** 0.008
Students with more than 95% attendance (%) 54.4 46.4 8.0 ** 0.045
Average total credits attempted 13.9 13.7 0.2 0.347
Attempted at least 11 credits (%) 95.4 91.9 3.5 * 0.056
Average total credits earned 12.3 11.5 0.8 ** 0.015 ††
Earned at least 11 credits (%) 77.5 68.9 8.6 ** 0.017 †††
At least 1 Regents Exam taken (%) 86.3 79.7 6.6 ** 0.033
At least 1 Regents Exam passed (%) 74.4 67.3 7.1 * 0.056
Sample size 298 286
Scored below proficiency level
on annual math test in prior school year
a
Average attendance rate 82.1 81.6 0.5 0.675
Students with more than 95% attendance (%) 29.0 26.9 2.1 0.435
Average total credits attempted 13.4 13.3 0.2 0.445
Attempted at least 11 credits (%) 90.3 85.1 5.2 *** 0.005
Average total credits earned 8.7 9.0 -0.3 0.315 ††
Earned at least 11 credits (%) 43.4 47.2 -3.8 0.193 †††
At least 1 Regents Exam taken (%) 61.2 59.2 1.9 0.493
At least 1 Regents Exam passed (%) 22.3 21.8 0.5 0.838
Sample size 565 578
9th-Grade Students
by Prior-Year (8th-Grade) Math Test Score:
First-Year Impacts on Attendance and Credits
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Table 9
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from NYC Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Tests for statistical significance on impacts across subgroups were only calculated for Grade 9 
attendance and credits outcomes. Tests for other outcomes will be calculated in the future. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
The H-statistic test was used to test for statistically significant differences in impact estimates across 
different subgroups. Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 
percent; † = 10 percent.
First-year education results cover the 2007-08 school year.
aIn New York State, a test score that is at level 3 or above on a 4-level scale is deemed to be a 
"proficient" level of achievement.
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Appendix Table 1 
 
Schedule of Incentives Payments, by Domain  
       
 
A. Children’s Educational Efforts and Achievement 
 
 
Grades 1-8 (Payments made to parents): 
 
 Attendance: $25 per child per month (max: $250 per year, covering 10 months of school) for satisfactory 
attendance (95% of scheduled days, with provision for extended illness).  
 
 Parent-teacher conferences: $25 per conference, 2x per year (max: $50 per year per child) for parent’s 
attendance at parent-teacher conferences. 
 
 Library card: $50 paid once during program if child gets (or has) a public library card. 
 
 Reviewing results of low-stakes interim tests: $25 for parents to acquire and review on their own their 
children’s performance on interim standardized tests intended to help teachers diagnose students’ progress 
(up to 5 times per year; max: $125 per year per child). (Dropped in second year of the program.) 
 
 Test scores (starting in grade 3):  
 
 For grades 3-5: $300 per child for scoring at a level 3 (indicating proficiency) or above on 
standardized ELA test, or (starting in grade 4) for improving by at least 1 level over prior year’s level; 
same for standardized math test. (Max: $600 per year per child.) 
 
 For grades 6-8: $350 per test for meeting the same conditions. (Max: $700 per year per child.) 
 
 Discussing results of annual ELA and math tests with school (starting in grade 3): $25 per test, 1x per 
year (max: $50 per year per child) for parents to discuss child’s test results with teachers or principal and 
get confirmatory signature. 
  
 
Grades 9-12 (Payments split between parents and students, as indicated below) 
 
 Attendance: $50 per child per month (max: $500 per year, covering 10 months of school) for satisfactory 
attendance (95% of scheduled days, with provision for extended illness). (50% paid to student, 50% paid 
to parent.) 
 
 Parent-teacher conferences: $25 per conference, 2x per year (max: $50 per year per child), for parent’s 
attendance at parent-teacher conferences. (100% paid to parent.) 
 
 Library card: $50 one-time payment if child gets (or has) a public library card. (100% paid to student.) 
 
 Test scores: $600 per child for passing (i.e., scoring 65 or above on) each of 5 Regents tests (max: $3,000 
during program) (100% paid to student.) 
 
 Credit accumulation: $600 per year per child for accumulating 11 credits during a school year. (50% paid 
to student, 50% paid to parent.)  
 
 PSAT: $50 for taking PSAT test up to 2 times (max: $100 during program). (100% paid to student.) 
 
 Graduation: $400 payment for graduating high school. (50% paid to student, 50% paid to parent.) 
 
Continued  
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B. Family Preventive Health Care Practices 
  
 
Maintaining health insurance:  
 
 $20 per month (max: $240 per year) for each parent for maintaining public health insurance (including 
Medicaid and Family Health Plus coverage) for each parent.  
 
 $20/month (max: $240 per year) for maintaining Medicaid or SCHIP coverage for all children (together). 
[Not for TANF recipients due to near-automatic Medicaid enrollment.] 
 
 $50/month (max: $600 per year) for each parent for maintaining private/employer health insurance for each 
parent. $50 per month (max: $600 per year) for maintaining private/employer insurance for all children 
(together).  
 
Nonemergency health screenings and early intervention:  
 
 For adults and children: $200 per family member per year for completing an annual nonemergency 
medical check-up. Physician must fill out “preventive health care form” indicating that a minimum set of 
age-appropriate screenings and assessments was conducted and that other health information was reviewed 
with the patient and/or parent. $100 per family member per year for completing a physician-advised follow-
up visit within a specified timeframe.  
 
 For young infants and toddlers (children under 30 months of age): $200 per child for completing a 
pediatrician-advised early intervention evaluation. 
 
 Dental care: $100 per family member for cleaning and check-up, 2x per year for ages 6+ and 1x per year 
for ages 1-5. 
 
 
C. Adult Workforce Efforts 
 
 
Sustained full-time employment: 
 
 $300 for working full time (at least 30 hrs/week for 6 or more weeks in each 2-month payment period — 
i.e., approximately 75% of the time) (max: $1,800 per year @$150/month) 
 
Education and training while employed:  
 
 Payments for completing an approved education or training course while holding a job. Must work at least 
10 hrs/week while attending course. $200 per each course lasting 35-70 hours; $400 per each course lasting 
71 to 140 hours; $600 for each 141-hour increment of a course lasting at least 141 hours (max: $3,000 per 
adult during program). (Training may include ESL, basic skills, and GED prep courses.) 
 
